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THE VIA TICAL SETTLEMENT INDUSTR Y:
BETTING ON PEOPLE'S LIVES IS
CERTAINLY NO "EXA CTA"
Liza M. Ray*
INTRODUCTION
When an individual is faced with a terminal illness,' there are numerous
issues to consider and many options to weigh. The most crucial matters to
settle include sorting out financial considerations. Rising health care
costs have left many terminally ill persons in a financially vulnerable
position, including those who have health care insurance.3 In addition to
the concern over medical bills, terminally ill patients may also be troubled
by familial, employment, and personal finance difficulties.4 These
financial obligations may require depletion of retirement or disability
funds, investments, and/or inheritances. Accordingly, those terminally ill
persons are left in dire need of immediate cashflow.
In the late 1980s, in response to the Acquired Immunodefficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) crisis, the viatical settlement industry emerged in an
effort to mitigate the financial burdens of terminally ill persons. A
viatical settlement is an investment contract in which an investor acquires
an interest in the life insurance policy of a terminally ill person, most
* Associate, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP; J.D. 2000, magna cum laude,
Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America; B.A. 1995, cum
laude, Miami University (Ohio).
1. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act defines
terminally ill individuals as "those who are certified by a physician as having an
illness or physical condition which can reasonably be expected to result in death in
twenty-four months or less after the date of certification." 26 U.S.C.A. §
101(g)(4)(A)(1997).
2. Alexander Eremia, Viatical Settlement and Accelerated Death Benefit Law:
Helping. Terminal, but not Chronically Ill Patients, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
773, 773 (1997).
3. Kathryn Sullivan and Joann Canning, Life Benefits from Insurance may be
Taxable, 21 TAX'N FOR L. 86, 86 (1992) (arguing that certain medical plans will
only subsidize a limited amount of expenses).
4. Eremia, supra note 2, at 773.
5. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 n.1 (D.D.C. 1995).
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typically a person suffering from AIDS.6 The life insurance policy is
usually purchased for sixty to eighty percent of its face value, depending
upon the terminally ill person's life expectancy.7 A viatical settlement
company may either hold the policy in its own account or sell the policy to
an investor.8 "When the insured dies, the investor or viatical settlement
company receives the benefit of the insurance."' Accordingly, "[t]he
investor's profit is the difference between the discounted purchase price
paid to the insured and the death benefit collected from the insurer, less
transaction costs, premiums paid, and other administrative expenses."'
For example, a terminally ill patient may sell his or her life insurance
policy worth $100,000 to an investor for $80,000 in order to receive
immediate cash prior to his or her death. The investor then continues to
pay the insurance premiums and, upon the death of the patient, receives
the full $100,000. Certain payout percentages are usually based on the life
expectancy of the terminally ill patient." Therefore, the shorter the
patient's life expectancy, the sooner the payoff for the investor and the
higher the profit.12  Likewise, if the patient exceeds his or her life
expectancy the profit decreases accordingly. In addition, the investor
runs the risk of new medical treatment or cures, which may extend the life
of the patient for months or years. 1
6. Id. at 17; Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 89 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1996)
(explaining that an investor acquires an interest in the life insurance policy of a
terminally ill person); see Kate Nagy, Viaticals for Cancer Patients Gain Popularity
in U.S., 87 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 244, 245 (1995). It is estimated that 85% of
viators are AIDS patients, 10% are cancer patients, and 5% have other terminally
ill diseases including heart disease, stroke or leukemia. Id.
7. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Ken Berzof,
Kentucky Acts to Protect Consumers in Viatical Insurance Deals, COURIER-
JOURNAL (Kentucky), Jan. 31, 2000, at IC. Some life insurance policies are sold
for a mere fifty percent of their face value.
8. Florida v. Viatical Services, Inc., 741 So. 2d 560, 561 (Fla. App. 1999).
9. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 537.
10. Id.
11. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Eterna Benefits L.L.C., No. 3:96-
CV-3065-D, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18670, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 1997).
12. Jane Bryant Quinn, Risks Cloud 'Viatical' Investments, THE TIMES UNION
(Albany, NY), Sept. 24, 2000, at C1.
13. See Nagy, supra note 6, at 245.
14. New Law Clarifies State Authority Over 'Viatical Investments'; Investments
in 'Death Futures' Among Top-Ten State Scams, BUSINESS WIRE, Oct. 10, 2000, at
1 (stating that "[w]ith new therapies coming onto the market every day, [betting
on when someone is going to die] is not a good bet").
The Viatical Settlement Industry
Viatical settlements may be viewed as practical estate-planning tools
for terminally ill persons. 5 These settlements represent a financial
resource that allows terminally ill persons to settle debts, reduce pain and
suffering and enjoy a higher quality of life during their remaining days.
1 6
Despite these benefits, however, viatical settlement companies have
become quite controversial because they market settlements through a
network of commissioned licensees who tend to prey on financially
vulnerable terminally ill patients.17 Viatical settlement companies hire
brokers and non-brokers who provide assessments on the health of the
patient to determine whether a patient's life expectancy may be extended
by medical developments. The viatical settlement process must be subject
to moral and ethical scrutiny, particularly concerning the relationships
between the various parties involved. There is an inherent power
imbalance between the viatical settlement company, or investor, and the
terminally ill patient as an insurance policy seller.' 8
The viatical settlement industry is highly controversial because it is
infected with scam artists, "ponzi" schemes, and other fraudulent
activities.'9 Viatical settlements are high-risk investments, particularly
because of the uncertainty of when a terminally ill person will die. New
drugs, the rise of "healthy" senior citizens, and advancements in medical
treatments are keeping people alive longer.2°  Investors are often
uninformed about such risks and are unaware of the fact that their
investment returns can dwindle rapidly if the person whose contract they
hold lives longer than expected.2' Terminally ill persons are also being
victimized by similar instances of fraud and misrepresentation. In a
process referred to as "cleansheeting," terminally ill persons are induced
to apply for life insurance policies and lie about their health status." For
example, a dying individual may be unduly influenced by a viatical
settlement company or broker to take out a life insurance policy by
15. Eremia, supra note 2, at 775.
16. Abbie Crites-Leoni & Angellee Chen, Regulating the Viatical Settlement
Industry, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 5 (1997).
17. See generally Nicole Ostrow, Policies Pose Ethical Issues; Seniors Market a
Growing Target, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, FL), July 23, 2000, at 1F.
18. Joy Kosiewicz, Death for Sale: A Call To Regulate the Viatical Settlement
Industry, 48 CASE W. RESERVE L.R. 701, 702 (1998).
19. Berzof, supra note 7.
20. Id.
21. Stuart Hirsch, State Lawmakers Considering Legislation to Regulate
Viaticals, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 20, 2000, at C1.
22. Id.
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concealing the fact that he or she has a terminal illness. By doing so, an
individual is likely to get a higher insurance benefit as an "artificial"
healthy person and the viatical settlement industry would proceed to
23purchase the insurance policy at a highly discounted rate. Often times,
the terminally ill person may not even have an opportunity to see the
• 24policy.
Cleansheeting and other fraudulent activities must be addressed in
either state or federal insurance legislation. The primary problem with
the viatical settlement industry is the lack of regulation. Because viatical
settlements are part insurance, part security, they fall into a regulatory
"no-man's land."25  As Kentucky's Deputy Insurance Commissioner
stated, "We're in unchartered waters. It's evolving. And whenever you
have a case of something that's unregulated, there's a lot of opportunity
for fraud to occur., 26  Because of either nonexistent or inadequate
regulation, 'viatical scams have become one of the nation's top ten
financial cons." The first portion of this Comment defines and analyzes
viatical settlements and the primary players in the viatical settlement
industry. This discussion includes further descriptions of the current
fraudulent practices that have recently invaded the industry. The next
portion of this Comment provides an outline of the current regulation of
the viatical settlement industry. This analysis includes an in-depth
discussion of the inadequacies of current regulatory schemes and the
problems that regulators face in enacting appropriate legislation. Finally,
the last portion provides an analysis of the ethical problems facing the
viatical settlement industry and proposes options that may remedy these
ethics issues. Specifically, state or federal legislation should be enacted in
order to provide adequate protection of the terminally ill person, or
insurance policy seller, in the viatical settlement process. To achieve this
end, the following principles must be applied: (1) a viatical settlement
company or investor should owe an ethical, or fiduciary-type, obligation
to the terminally ill person who has sold his or her life insurance to the
company or investor; (2) valuable medical information that could improve
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Kathy Kristof, Investors Buy Life Insurance Policies At Less Than Face
Value From the Terminally Ill, Senior Citizens; Viaticals Become Big Business,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 2000.
26. Berzof, supra note 7.
27. New Law Clarifies State Authority Over 'Viatical Investments, Investments
in 'Death Futures' Among Top-Ten State Scams, BUSINESS WIRE, Oct. 10, 2000, at
The Viatical Settlement Industry
a terminally ill person's condition must be disclosed to such person; (3)
terminally ill persons who are contemplating viatical settlements must be
provided with adequate information that will help such persons make a
sound economic decision; and (4) the status of a terminally ill person
whose life insurance policy has been sold to an investor must be kept in
strict confidence. State or federal regulation must address and implement
these issues in order to effectively protect the dignity, health and safety of
terminally ill persons.
I. DEFINING AND REFINING VIATICAL SETrLEMENTS
A. Exploring the Ecclesiastical Roots of the Viatical Settlement
Practice
The phrase "viatical settlement" stems from the ecclesiastical term
"viaticum," which refers to the "communion given to a dying person., 28
This occurs during the Roman Catholic sacrament of "extreme unction."' 9
Its Latin interpretation translates into the phrase "journey money," or
"money provided for a long journey."30  Before travelers or Roman
soldiers would endure a long journey or adventure, they were often given
a purse of money and supplies." Given the somewhat somber origins of
viatical settlements, it is not surprising that the industry is often described
as "ghoulish.,
32
By allowing others to make an economic profit from an individual's
death, the viatical settlement industry encourages unethical values and
morals.33 An investor, as an economic stakeholder in a short-term
investment, normally desires that a terminally ill policy seller die as soon
28. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14,17 (D.D.C. 1995).
29. Eremia, supra note 2, at 774 n.9.
30. See Nagy, supra note 6, at 245. See also John Schofield, 20th-Century
Vampires: AIDS has Given Rise to a Controversial Industry; Viatical Settlements,
MACLEAN'S (Health Canada), No. 21, Vol. 110, May 26, 1997, at 46.
31. Nagy, supra note 6, at 774 n.9.
32. See Nagy supra note 6, at 245; Lehr, AIDS Patients Reap Benefits by
Selling Their Insurance, BOSTON GLOBE, July 25, 1993, at 1.
33. Huberto Cruz, Someone Has to Die Before an Investor Can Collect on
Viaticals, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Oct. 1, 1999, at 6D; Michael Perrault,
Life Insurance Policies: Cashing in Before Death, 45 DENVER Bus. J., Sept. 24,
1993, at 6B (stating that the Colorado Division of Insurance calls into question the
ethics of the purchase and sale of life insurance policies in connection with viatical
settlements).
20001
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as possible." The investor has bought the right to become an irrevocable
beneficiary of another person's life insurance policy, thus reversing the
usual role of the beneficiary in relation to the dying individual.35 In other
words, a terminally ill person normally would prefer that the proceeds
from a life insurance policy be awarded to an individual who bears a close
and personal relation to such person." Life insurance beneficiaries are
typically family members, including spouses, siblings, parents and other
close relatives. Accordingly, such beneficiaries would generally have an
interest in keeping the terminally ill patient alive as long as possible, as
opposed to wishing an expeditious death upon the patient.
Despite the seemingly immoral practices that may be involved in the
viatical settlement industry, terminally ill persons not only willingly enter
into such arrangements, but are often grateful to the investors for the
opportunity to receive an immediate economic benefit.37 As the Latin
interpretation suggests, the money received from viatical settlements can
help prepare the ill and distressed for their "long journey." Allowing
terminally ill patients to acquire large sums of money during their living
days often prepares them better for death.38 In addition, the economic
benefit allows terminally ill persons to continue living as comfortably as
possible and to enjoy more control over life in general. 9 The money from
the viatical settlement allows the terminally ill patient to pay outstanding
and current medical expenses and to purchase supporting medical care. .. . 40
including home nursing care and pain relieving medication.
34. See Perrault, supra note 33, at 6B (stating that "individuals or companies
investing in such policies don't necessarily have an incentive to see the
policyholders live").
35. Id.
36. Roy M. Adams, Unlocking New Value From Old Policies: Life Insurance
Planning and Life Settlements, TRUSTS & ESTATES, May 1, 2000, at 44.
37. Perrault, supra note 33, at 6B. See also Schofield, supra note 30, at 47
(stating that a terminally ill seller was able to pay down his debts, buy an
automobile for his ex-wife, lend his mother a hand in purchasing a home, and help
fund his son's future education with the proceeds he received from his viatical
settlement).
38. See generally Nagy, supra note 6.
39. See id.; Schofield, supra note 30, at 48 (seller asserted that the viatical
settlement provided him with an opportunity to assert control over his life and
actually gave him the encouragement to live much longer than expected).
40. Michael Perrault, Life Insurance Policies: Cashing in Before Death,
DENVER Bus. J., Sept. 24, 1993, at 6B. See Anne Rackham, New Firms Cashing in
on AIDS Patients' Insurance; Part 5; Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
Among California Workers: AIDS in the Workplace, L. A. Bus. J., Aug. 31, 1992,
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Despite the conflicting views regarding the viatical settlement practice,
41the industry continues to gain ground, particularly in economic terms.
Viatical settlements have increased "from a $90 million business in 1991
to $1 billion today., 42 "[A]ccording to the National Viatical Association
(NVA), [this increase is] roughly 20 times as much as when the business
began., 43  Thus, to offer terminally ill persons better protection from
fraud and abuse, there is a pressing need to explore what can be done to
remedy the unethical aspects of the viatical settlement industry.
B. The Emergence of a New Investment Medium in Response to the
AIDS Crisis
During the late 1980s, the AIDS epidemic spawned a heightened
awareness of the true evils and realities of this deadly disease." 44The
epidemic created a large pool of persons with relatively short life
expectancies and "without traditional benefit" concerns." Accordingly,
there was a pressing need to render economic aid to these persons. 46 In
order to respond to this need, viatical settlement companies emerged to
provide relief from the economic hardships of the rising medical costs of
persons living with AIDS.47  Viatical settlements "supposedly" allow
patients a viable option to finance their medical expenses and enjoy a
higher quality of life during their remaining days.48 "In recent years as
medical developments have prolonged the lives of many AIDS patients,
at 1.
41. See Cruz, supra note 33.
42. Id.
43. Daniel Eisenberg, Making a Killing: Viaticals Let Sick People Sell Their
Life Insurance. But Investing in Death May Not Always Be the Best Bet, TIME,
Nov. 29, 1999, at "Time Select Bus."
44. Steven L. Severin & Stephen R. Corrick, Sale Treatment for Viatical
Settlements of Life Insurance, 82 J. TAX'N 25, 35 (1995) (noting that the AIDS
epidemic is the primary cause of the increasing demand for viatical settlements);
Miriam Albert, Symposium on Health Care Policy: What Lessons We Have
Learned From the AIDS Pandemic: Article: Selling Death Short: The Regulatory
and Policy Implications of Viatical Settlements, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1013, 1014 n.1
(1998) (stating that AIDS is now the leading cause of death among all Americans
between the ages of 25 and 44).
45. Shaun Schafer, Oklahoma, Other States Move to Regulate Viaticals, TULSA
WORLD, Oct. 19, 1999, at 1 (stating that the AIDS epidemic provided a market for
viatical settlements to arise).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Death Futures, CITY NEWS SERV., Oct. 10, 2000, at 1.
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viaticals for these kind of patients have dramatically decreased in
popularity., 49 However, the use of viatical settlements has increased
among other terminally ill persons, including heart disease and cancer
patients.50
When viatical settlement companies originated, they primarily acted as
"brokers," bringing together investors and terminally ill persons with life
insurance policies available for sale, in addition to providing underwriting
and negotiating functions as well." As the industry matured, however,
viatical settlement companies acted as "providers," buying the life
insurance policies from terminally ill persons and subsequently holding
them as the named beneficiaries.52 As the Viatical Association of
America explains, "[T]he NAIC [National Association of Insurance
Commissioners]" Model Act and Model Regulation differentiates
between 'viatical settlement providers' and 'viatical settlement brokers,'
recognizing the differences in these two roles by requiring both to be
licensed, but requiring providers to post a bond, while brokers must
simply maintain errors and omissions coverage."54
In recent years, viatical settlement companies have performed both theS 55
broker and provider functions. Whether a viatical settlement company is
acting as either a broker or provider, or both, the company realizes a
profit from entering into transactions with terminally ill policyholders. 6
The patients, on the other hand, actually suffer an economic loss.
Although they enjoy the benefit of immediate cash, policyholders do not
receive the full value of the benefits of the life insurance policies.57 As
49. Deborah Highland, Investing in Death; Need For Cash Has Elderly and
Terminally Ill Hawking Their Life, THE TENNESSEAN, Mar. 14, 2000, at iD.
50. Id.
51. John Freeman Blake, Life Insurance Proceeds Can Be Received Tax Free
Prior to Death Under New Proposed Regulations, 79 J. TAX'N 156, 156 (1993).
Albert, supra note 44, at 1017.
52. Albert, supra note 44, at 1018; Blake, supra note 51, at 1017 n.20
(discussing the differences between brokers and providers).
53. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
54. Albert, supra note 44, at 1017.
55. Gretchen Henkel, Viatical Settlements and How They Work, VENTURA
Co. STAR, Dec. 9, 1999, at D8.
56. Albert, supra note 44, at 1019.
57. Charles E. Schmidt, Jr., Shady Agent, Viatical Mix Creates Recipe For
Fraud: Unscrupulous Life Insurance Agents and Policyholders With AIDS Are
Finding Ways to Defraud Insurers Through Viatical Settlements, 96 BEST'S REV. -
Life-Health Insurance Ed., March, 1996, at 68 (describing how one gentleman sold
his $250,000 policy for only $100,000 to a viatical settlement company). James E.
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discussed infra, this inequity must be remedied through state or federal
insurance regulation.
C. Who are the Primary Players in the Viatical Settlement Practice?
1. Viatical Settlement Companies
Viatical settlement companies are often referred to as viatical
settlement providers (or VSPs).' As set forth in New Jersey's state
statute, a VSP is defined as:
a person, other than a viator, who enters into a viatical
settlement contract. Viatical settlement provider also means a
person who obtains financing from a financing entity for the
purchase, acquisition, transfer or other assignment of one or
more viatical settlement .contracts, viaticated policies or
interests therein, or otherwise sells, assigns, transfers, pledges,
hypothecates or otherwise disposes of one or more viatical
settlement contracts, viaticated policies or interests therein. 9
Consistent with many other state laws and regulations, New Jersey
requires that VSPs acquire an operating license from the state insurance
commissioner in order to conduct business in the viatical settlement
practice.60 In addition, VSPs may only use forms of a viatical settlement
Melville, president of Universal Guaranty Life Insurance Co., responds to such
unfairness by stating that "[I]t is going to take industry coordination and
cooperation to solve it, and that isn't going to happen unless we have industry
recognition of the problem." Id.
58. Eremia, supra note 2, at 775.
59. 1999 N.J. Laws 211(1). The statute further provides that a viatical
settlement provider does not include:
(1) A bank, savings bank, savings and loan association, credit union or
other licensed lending institution that takes an assignment of a life
insurance policy as collateral for a loan;
(2) The issuer of a life insurance policy providing accelerated benefits...
and pursuant to the policy; or
(3) A natural person who enters into no more than one agreement in a
calendar year for the transfer of life insurance policies for any value less
than the expected death benefit. Id.
60. Id. at 211(2). Similarly, Connecticut provides that a VSB shall not
include:
(A) an attorney, accountant or financial planner retained to represent a
viator and whose compensation is paid by or at the discretion of the
viator,(B) a viatical settlement provider, viatical settlement agent or
financing entity, or ... (C) a credit union, employer or association which
provides information relating to viatical settlements to its members or
2000]
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contract or disclosure statements in its dealings with a viator, which have
been approved by the insurance commissioner of New Jersey. 61 These
provisions are intended to help reduce instances of fraud and
misrepresentation in the viatical settlement practice and to ensure both
62viator and investor protection.
VSPs may also act as, or contract out, viatical settlement brokers (or
VSBs).63 According to New Jersey's statute, a VSB is considered:
a person who on behalf of a viator and for a fee, commission or
other valuable consideration, offers or attempts to negotiate
viatical settlements between a viator and one or more viatical
settlement providers. Irrespective of the manner in which the
viatical settlement broker is compensated, a viatical settlement
broker is deemed to represent only the viator .... The term
does not include an attorney, accountant or financial planner
retained to represent the viator whose compensation is paid
directly by or at the direction of the viator.64
In accordance with New Jersey law, VSBs may not conduct business in the
65
state unless they obtain a license from the state insurance commissioner.
Brokers stand in a unique position with the terminally ill policyholders
in that they are often bound by both "fiduciary" and "best interests of the
66
policyholder" standards. It is important to note that most viatical
brokers are not stockbrokers or insurance persons, they 'are simply
persons that put the viatical deals together. However, Kentucky and
Mississippi are now requiring viatical brokers to pass licensing exams.67
employees. 1999 Conn. Pub. Acts 145 § 4(8).
Other state statutes that have adopted comparable definitions and requirements
of VSPs include: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-465(10) (1999), 72 Del. Laws §132(1)(g)
(1999), 1999 Kan. Sess. Laws 151(2)(h), and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §
6802(8) (West 1999).
61. 1999 N.J. Laws 211(1).
62. Berzof, supra note 7, at 1C.
63. Id.
64. 1999 N.J. Laws 211(1).
65. Other states that have adopted similar definitions and laws for VSBs
include: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-465(8) (1999), 72 Del. Laws 132(2)(e) (1999),
1999 Kan. Sess. Laws 151(2)(f), IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-19.8-8.7 (Burns 1999), and
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 6802(8) (West 1999).
66. N.J. STAT. ANN. §17B:304(1) (West 2000) (stating that "a viatical
settlement broker is deemed to represent only the viator and owes a fiduciary duty
to the viator to act according to the viator's best instructions and in the best
interest of the viator.").
67. Ruth Gastel, Insurance Fraud, III INS. ISSUES UPDATE, Oct., 2000, at 5.
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Brokers typically receive as compensation from the viatical investment
company ten to eighteen percent of the purchase price of the insurance
policy.
Brokers, however, are certainly not new to fraudulent schemes. Some
brokers will not acquire the best deal available for the policy seller, an ill
and vulnerable person.68 In such instances, brokers will recruit persons
with terminal or serious illnesses that are in dire financial need and
purchase life insurance policies on such persons without revealing to the
insurance company their true physical condition. 69 Here, an insurance
company would have only two years to discover the fraud in order to
cancel the contract; however, "unscrupulous viatical brokers have become
adept at hiding fraudulent activities for the two years."7°
Both VSPs and VSBs enter into viatical contracts with terminally ill
policyholders, the outcome of which is referred to as a "viatical
settlement," or "proceed distribution."'" A viatical settlement formally
refers to:
a transaction between a viator and a viatical settlement provider
in which the viatical settlement provider pays compensation or
other value in return for the viator's assignment, transfer, sale,
devise or bequest to the viatical settlement provider of the
ownership of or death benefit payable under a life insurance•• 72
policy or a certificate.
The viatical settlement contract binds a VSP, VSB, or another investor
and the terminally ill policyholder to its terms.73 As parties to viatical
settlement contracts, both VSPs and VSBs are also bound to comply with
state and federal contract laws, including the requirement of "good faith
and fair dealing" in the performance of contracts.74
68. Eisenberg, supra note 43. One viator indicated that she only received
$5400, or 6% of the value of her $90,000 life insurance policy due to the fraudulent
activities of her broker.
69. NAIC Viatical Model Law Draft Would Include Life Settlements, BestWire,
Aug. 31, 2000 at 1.
70. Ruth Gastel, Insurance Fraud, III Ins. Issues Update, October, 2000, at 5.
71. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-465(13) (1999).
72. Id. See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 6802(7) (West 1999).
73. See id. (stating that under a viatical settlement agreement, an insured sells
a life insurance policy for an immediate payment equal to the discounted face
value of such policy).
74. 1999 N.J. Laws 211(1). A "viatical settlement contract" means:
a written agreement entered into between a viatical settlement provider
and a viator. The agreement shall establish the terms under which the
viatical settlement provider will pay compensation or anything of value,
2000]
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2. Investors or Viatical Purchasers
A VSP entering into a viatical settlement contract may either keep the
life insurance policy or sell the rightsifi the policy to an "investor."75 The
investor then pays the premiums on the life insurance policy and
subsequently collects the benefits at the time the original insured passes
away. Due to the risky nature of investing in viatical settlements, both
state governments and the federal government need to regulate the
viatical settlement industry in order to better protect the investor.77
Several investors have demanded that viatical settlement companies must
provide adequate disclosure regarding the risks associated with viatical
settlements, including the possibility that profits may be diminished or
decreased by advances in medicine that may prolong the life of terminally
78
ill persons. In addition, several investors have complained that viatical
settlement companies present materials about both yield and return in
false and misleading terms.79 Some companies have even advertised
promised returns of up to fifty-five percent on an investment.80
The investor stands in a unique position with the terminally ill person,
as does the VSP. It is normally in the best financial interest of the
investor or VSP for the terminally ill person to die prior to the predicated
which compensation or value is less than the expected death benefit of
the insurance policy or certificate, in return for the viator's assignment,
transfer, sale, devise or bequest of the death benefit or ownership of all or
a portion of the insurance policy or certificate of insurance to the viatical
settlement provider. A viatical settlement contract also includes a
contract for a loan or other financial transaction secured primarily by an
individual or group life insurance policy, other than a loan by a life
insurance company pursuant to the terms of the life insurance contract,
or a loan secured by the cash value of a policy. Id.
75. Florida v. Viatical Services, Inc., 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 10478 at *2.
76. Heike Wipperfurth, At Death's Door, Business Thrives; Viatical Industry
Finds a New Market: Elderly, CNS, Sept. 4, 2000, at 24.
77. Schafer, supra note 45, at 1. See also SEC. v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d at
537.
78. Mealey's Publications, Inc., Florida Plaintiffs Say Investor Kept Quiet
About New Treatments, Lied About Viatical Settlement Returns, 3 MEALEY'S LIT.
REP., Nov. 19, 1998, at 1.
79. See id. (stating that Accelerated Benefits, a viatical settlement company,
supplied written statements to investors that were false and misleading because
they detailed both duration and annualized yield of viatical settlements, neither of
which can be determined with any true accuracy).
80. See Berzof, supra note 7.
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date." Often, an investor may be required to pay for a tracking service in
order to keep tabs on the terminally ill patient and notify the investor
when he or she dies. 82 There are two competing interests in need of
protection during the viatical settlement process. On the one hand, there
is a need to protect an investor from fraud and manipulation in the
investment process by requiring full disclosure of the risks associated with
83investing in viatical settlements. On the other hand, there is a pressing
demand to protect a terminally ill patient from not only entering into
unconscionable agreements, but also from potential abuse by an investor
or VSP. 4
3. Sellers or Viators
There are several terms which essentially refer to the same party in a
viatical settlement contract. A terminally ill person who sells his or her
life insurance policy to a viatical settlement company is normally deemed
to be the "viator. ' ,85 A "viator" is most often referred to as:
the owner of a life insurance policy, or a holder of a certificate,
which policy or certificate insures the life of an individual with a
catastrophic or life-threatening illness or condition and who
enters or seeks to enter into a viatical settlement contract.
Viator shall not include a viatical settlement provider, viatical
settlement agent, viatical settlement broker or financing entity.
The terminally ill policyholder may also be referred to as the "seller" or
the "insured." ' As discussed supra, an investor's profit depends wholly
on the life expectancy of the viator. 8 Thus, it is necessary to limit or
prohibit the amount and nature of contact between the VSP, or investor,
and the viator through regulation.89 After all, the VSP is betting that the
terminally ill person will die prior to a specified date, as predicted by the
81. See Cruz, supra note 33.
82. See Schafer, supra note 45.
83. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also
Armstrong v. Oklahoma, 811 P.2d 593, 595 (Okia. Crim. App. 1991).
84. AP, State Asks Firms Buying Insurance To Sign Up Early, THE
TENNESSEAN, Aug. 27, 2000, at 5B.
85. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 n.3 (D.D.C. 1995) (stating
that "[t]he Model Viatical Settlement Acts refer to the insured as a 'viator"').
86. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-465(12). See also 1999 N.J. Laws 211(1), 72 Del.
Laws 132(1)(h), and 1999 Kan. Sess. Laws § 151(2)(i) (adopting similar
definitions).
87. Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 17 n.3.
88. Id.
89. Albert, supra note 44, at 1013.
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VSP.90 Thus, the sooner the viator passes away, the greater the profit that
the VSP or investor will realize." There is an inherent risk that an angry
investor may attempt to "accelerate maturity" by tampering with the life
of a terminally ill policyholder. 92 Tampering may include the withholding
of pertinent medical information relating to treatments that may improve
a patient's illness or actively seeking out patients and attempting to
induce death.93
Several states have addressed the issue of providing adequate
disclosure to viators. 94 Most of the current state regulations require that
viators are provided with enough information to make an informed
decision about whether to enter into viatical settlements.9 In addition,
other efforts have been made to protect and promote the best interests of
the viator. In January 1997, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act ("HIPAA")9% became effective, granting terminally or
chronically ill persons with life insurance policies tax-free disbursements
of their policy benefits while they are still living.97 Since, under HIPAA,
90. Kosiewicz, supra note 18, at 701.
91. Id.
92. See Jane Bryant Quinn, The Lottery on Lives, NEWSWEEK, March 15,
1999, at 55 (stating that there is great danger when wagering on lives, particularly
if an angry investor decides to take action to speed up the opportunity to cash in
on his or her investment). See also Wipperfurth, supra note 76, at 24 (stating that
"at what point does the financial interest become powerful enough to induce
murder?"); Ostrow, supra note 17, at iF (stating that "million dollar senior
policies might lead to someone putting a 'bounty' on the policyholder").
93. See Jane Bryant Quinn, The Lottery on Lives, NEWSWEEK, March 15,
1999, at 55; See also Wipperfurth, supra note 76, at 24; Ostrow, supra note 17, at
1F.
94. See Jane Bryant Quinn, The Lottery on Lives, NEWSWEEK, March 15,
1999, at 55; See also Wipperfurth, supra note 76, at 24; Ostrow, supra note 17, at
IF.
95. R.J. Herron, Regulating Viatical Settlements: Is the Invisible Hand Picking
the Pockets of the Terminally Ill?, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 931, 935-6 (1995) (noting
that state regulations focus on disclosure to viators, requiring enough information
for a viator to make an educated choice to vitiate).
96. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 26 U.S.C. §
101(g) (1997).
97. A "chronically ill" person does not include:
a terminally ill individual as having been certified by a licensed health
care practitioner within the preceding twelve month period (i) as being
unable to perform (without substantial assistance from another
individual) at least two activities of daily living for a period of at least
ninety days due to a loss of functional capacity; or (ii) as having a level of
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the viators are receiving only a discounted value of their life insurance
policies, the tax-free treatment is a tremendous benefit to viators and
98their families, particularly when payouts are often $50,000 or more.
These regulatory efforts should continue to move forward in the direction
of viator protection. In the meantime, it would be in the viators' best
interests to perform the necessary research in order to find the best deal
and also to consult with a financial planner, accountant or attorney prior




Most VSPs require that a potential seller of a life insurance policy be
reviewed by a physician in order to determine the life expectancy of the
individual.9 °  Such physicians are often referred to as "independent
reviewing physicians" and are normally on the payroll of the viatical
settlement company or referred by the company.)° Difficult issues arise
with respect to the doctor-patient relationship that is created by, or
facilitated by, the VSP, including issues of confidentiality and trust.
One of the major concerns in this area is the confidential treatment of
the viator's medical records and correspondence with the reviewing
physician. A viator should be hesitant to hand over, or permit unlimited
access to, medical records.'O° At least one state, Florida, has ruled in
Florida v. Viatical Services, Inc. that a patient may lose his or her
constitutional protection if he or she agreed to a limited waiver to the
right of privacy as a part of the business deal with a VSP.0 3 In the
transaction at issue, the viator was required to allow the viatical
settlement company, and potentially an investor, to inspect the viator's
disability similar (as determined under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services) to the level of disability
described above; or (iii) requiring substantial supervision to protect such
an individual from threats to health and safety due to severe cognitive
impairment). 26 U.S.C. § 101(g)(4)(B) (1997).
98. Eremia, supra note 2, at 773-774. Viators should be aware, however, that
the sudden income from the life insurance policy may affect other financial areas,
including Social Security benefits or disability payments. See Highland, supra
note 49, at 1D.
99. Highland, supra note 49, at 1D.
100. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc, 87 F.3d 536, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
101. Id.
102. Privacy Rights Can't Be Invoked, 14 AIDS POL'Y & L., Sept. 3, 1999, at
1.
103. Florida v. Viatical Services, Inc., 741 So.2d 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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medical records.'9 If the viator did not agree to the waiver, he or she
would not be able to receive the cash benefits of the life insurance
policy.
The court found that the medical privacy privilege could not be
invoked in order to protect the terminally ill person from invasion by a•106
VSP or an investor. As the court explains, "[W]e question whether the
right of privacy of one's medical records exists where that person's
medical condition has become an essential condition of a commercial
transaction, at least with respect to those persons involved in the
transaction and those entities who may be charged with monitoring such
transactions. The court also noted that because the medical records
were deemed to be a part of a commercial transaction regulated by state
law, the state also has authority to inspect the documents. Viatical
settlement companies must erect appropriate firewalls between investors
and policyholders in order to effectively protect the privacy of
policyholders from impatient investors.
09
5. Issuers or Insurance Companies
The insurance companies that issue life insurance policies play only a
small role in the viatical settlement process.10 Once the viator and VSP
or investor have entered into a viatical settlement contract, the VSP
usually forwards a change of ownership form and change of beneficiary
form to the insurance company."' The insurance company then records
the information provided in the forms, files the documents and forwards a
confirmation to the viator which reflects the change in ownership."' The
relationship between the viator and the insurance company ceases once
this process is complete.
Despite its meager role in the viatical settlement process, the insurance
company, or issuer, has a duty to disperse the life insurance benefits to the
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. AIDS POL'Y & L., supra note 102, at 1.
107. Id.
108. Eterna Benefits L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Accident Insurance Co., N.D.
Texas, No. 3:96-CV-3065-D (1998) at 4.
109. See Kathy Kristof, Viaticals Become Big Business, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1,
2000, at N6.
110. Herron, supra note 95, at 933.
111. Id. at 934.
112. Id.
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lawful beneficiary."' In certain circumstances, this may become an
arduous process. In Eterna Benefits v. Hartford Life and Accident
Insurance Co.,1"4 Clifford, a terminally ill person, sold his life insurance
policy at a discounted value to a viatical settlement company, Eterna
Benefits. 15  Dissatisfied with the arrangement, Clifford changed his
beneficiary from Eterna to his mother."6 The court determined that
Eterna Benefits was the intended beneficiary because Clifford failed to
comply with the original insurance policy requirements to change the
named beneficiary." 7 Even though insurance companies play a small role
in the viatical settlement process, this case illustrates how important their
role becomes upon the death of the insured.
II. REGULATION OF THE VIATICAL SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY
It is important to note that viatical settlements are somewhat118
problematic to regulate, particularly in light of their investment nature.
The bulk of regulation takes place at the state level, primarily through
state insurance laws." 9
However, many states have not adopted viatical settlement regulations,
leaving many terminally ill persons with no protection from potential
fraud and abuse by other players in the viatical settlement industry,
particularly VSPs.2° In response, state insurance departments have made
the eradication of viatical fraud a major priority. 2' State insurance
regulators in North Carolina, Texas, Florida and Nevada are working "to
shut down rings of viatical fraud offenders."'' 2  "Currently, the North
Carolina Department of Insurance is investigating more than 100 cases of
suspected fraud [involving viatical settlements].' '2 3  In addition, the
Florida Department of Insurance has also taken action by indicting
113. Henkel, supra note 55.
114. 1998 WL 874296 *1 (N.D. Tex.-Nov. 25, 1998).
115. Judge Orders Insurer To Pay Viatical Firm on Benefits Claim, AIDS
POL'Y AND L., Feb. 19, 1999, Vol. 14, No. 3 at 1. See id. at *1.
116. Id.
117. Eterna Benefits 1998 WL 874926 at *2.
118. Hirsch, supra note 21, at C1.
119. Kosiewicz, supra note 18, at 702.
120. See Herron, supra note 95, at 956.
121. Insurance Departments Look to Stamp Out Viatical Fraud, BESTWIRE,
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Future First Financial Group on multiple counts of grand theft. 124 "[T]he
five dealers and the viatical settlement company involved in the scheme
were charged with improperly buying and reselling $9.4 million worth of
life insurance policies from 53 different insurance companies.' ' 15 These
dealers would defraud viators and investors by making false
representations, including "[negating] the word 'viatical' from their names
and [using] the Internet, magazines and the radio to lure investors.'
126
These potentially deceptive businesses are highly organized and
manipulative, reaping millions of dollars of profits from vulnerable and
unprotected terminally ill persons. z7 Despite efforts made by these select
state insurance departments, Congress has not made any effort to enact
national regulation. Some states, including Tennessee, have not dealt
with viaticals in any regulatory capacity whatsoever."' In addition,
attempts to regulate these transactions under federal security law have
failed.
Although these agreements serve as investment vehicles and share
specific characteristics with securities, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit recently held that these contracts
were not securities and thus not regulated by the federal securities laws. 29
Accordingly, there are limited vehicles that states may employ to regulate
the viatical settlement industry. States must have the capacity to
capitalize resources and provide adequate laws within the insurance
regulatory scheme.
A. The Model Viatical Settlement Act and Model Regulation
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
promulgated a model act and model regulation.3 The model regulations
"were designed to protect viators when dealing with viatical settlement
companies.''. The NAIC model enforcement provisions include:




127. BESTWIRE, supra note 121, at 1.
128. Highland, supra note 49.
129. SEC v. Life Partners, 87 F.3d 536, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
130. Albert, supra note 44, at 1027 n.62-63 (noting that the NAIC is a
voluntary association comprised of insurance regulatory commissioners and staff
that adopted the Viatical Settlements Model Act at their June 1993 National
Meeting).
131. Id. at 1027.
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viators from viatical settlement companies."'
1. Ultimate Goal is Viator Protection
The NAIC Models work together to protect viators from entering into
unconscionable agreements with VSPs and exposure to unethical business.. 133
practices. They also set forth several important provisions aimed at
uniform regulation. First, they require that viatical settlement contracts
acquire prior approval and that each VSP comply with state
confidentiality laws.' 34 Secondly, the Model Act requires that all viatical
settlement contracts, or at least model or generic forms of the agreements,S • 135
be approved by the commissioner. Third, VSPs must hold proceeds of a
viatical settlement in an escrow or trust account until the policy has
transferred hands. 136  Lastly, the Act allows commissioners to set
standards for viatical settlement contract payments.
137
B. State Insurance Laws
Approximately thirty states regulate at least some aspects of the
viatical settlement industry. There are states, however, that do not
provide for any regulation at all. 139 States have adopted statutes and
regulations based on the NAIC Model Act and Model Regulation.14 0 The
states that provide regulations have an affirmative interest in protecting
viators from fraud and manipulation in the course of business dealings
with the viatical settlement industry. 4' Accordingly, state commissioners
often have the power to license viatical settlement companies and to
monitor the activities of such companies. In achieving this goal, state
regulations improve disclosure to viators and correct the information
imbalances and financial inequities that arise in the viatical settlement
practice. 42
132. Id.
133. See Carole Ann King, Brokers Receive Guidance on Life Settlements,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Jan. 31, 2000, at 7.
134. The Viatical Settlements Model Act § 9(B) (1994), at
http://www.insure.com/life/viatical/vsma.htmi (last visited Oct. 20, 2000).
135. Id.
136. See id. at § 9(C).
137. Crites-Leoni, supra note 16, at 10.
138. Ostrow, supra note 17, at 1F.
139. Id.
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C. The Securities and Exchange Commission's Attempt at Regulation
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) argued that viatical
settlements are securities. Therefore, VSPs should be required to register•143
with the SEC and provide adequate disclosure to their investors. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however,
disagreed, holding that viatical settlements were not securities.
14 4
Therefore, investors may not rely on the protections of the federal
securities laws and the SEC cannot intervene in viatical settlements.145
Even though the SEC was unable to assert jurisdiction over the viatical
settlement practice by bringing viatical settlements within the definition of
"securities," some states have been successful at regulating viaticals under
146the umbrella of state securities regulation. For example, the Kansas
Office of the Securities Commissioner issued an opinion stating that
viatical settlements are securities under state law and require• • 147
registration. In addition, some states require licensing of VSPs and
VSBs in order to conduct business in the viatical settlement industry in
state.49 Other states, including Kentucky; Rhode Island and California,
have followed this trend.
49
III. THE ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE VIATICAL
SETTLEMENT COMPANY OR INVESTOR
It is not surprising that the insurance industry has received wide
criticism for allowing VSPs and investors to profit from another person's
143. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
144. See id. at 549.
145. Schafer, supra note 45, at 108. See also Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 549.
146. See e.g., Blue-Sky-Policy, Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 27,595, Kentucky,
Viatical Settlements (2000); Blue-Sky Policy, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 50,511,
Rhode Island, Policy Statement on Viatical Settlement Contracts (2000); Report-
Letter, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) No. 1123, California Addresses Viatical
Settlement Contracts (Oct. 16, 2000).
147. Blue-Sky Policy, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 26,565, Kansas, Exemption
Request- Viatical Settlement Agreements are Investment Contracts that Must be
Registered (2000).
148. Schafer, supra note 45, at 106.
149. See Blue-Sky-Policy, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 27,595, Kentucky,
Viatical Settlements (2000); Blue-Sky Policy, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 50,511,
Rhode Island, Policy Statement on Viatical Settlement Contracts (2000); Report-
Letter, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) No. 1123, California Addresses Viatical
Settlement Contracts (Oct. 16, 2000).
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death.' However, the notion of profiting from death is not limited to the
viatical settlement industry. Medical and health care providers, funeral
home and pharmaceutical companies all benefit from the terminally ill
and the dead.' While it is not unethical to profit from death, the
methods which certain viatical companies employ in order to conduct
112business certainly deserve ethical scrutiny. Viatical settlement
regulation should focus on protecting the best interests of the viator and
his or her will to live. In order for such regulation to be successful, certain
obligations must be imposed on VSPs and investors regarding their
relationships with viators.
A. Applying Agency or Broker Principles in Order to Determine
Whether or Not a VSP Has Any Duty to the Viator
As outlined in various state statutes, VSBs represent only the viator
and owe a fiduciary duty to the viator to act in accordance with the
viator's instructions and in the best interests of the viator. Considering
the role of the broker in the viatical settlement process, it would not be
unreasonable to impose similar standards upon VSPs. As VSPs normally
have the most access to confidential information, such as viator medical
records, they should be required to meet the highest ethical standards.'
1. Exploring the Notion of Imposing a Fiduciary Duty upon
the VSP or Investor
The ultimate aim of regulation of the viatical settlement industry
should be protection of the viator"' Viators require protection from
VSPs and investors with overreaching adverse interest.56 VSPs should
have a fiduciary duty to the viators. This standard should require that a
VSP act with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity
and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise
150. See Lehr, supra note 33, at 1. See also Ostrow, supra note 17, at IF;
Wipperfurth, supra note 76, at 24.
151. Crites-Leoni, supra note 16, at 14.
152. Miller, supra note 17, at Al.
153. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-19.8 (Mitchie 1999). See also 1999 N.J. Laws
211(1) and 72 Del. Laws § 132(l)(e) (1999).
154. David Shook, New Jersey Looks for Ways to Regulate Viatical
Settlements' Market, THE RECORD (NJ), Sept. 30, 1999, at 1.
155. See Crites-Leoni, supra note 16, at 9, 12, 14.
156. Id. at 14.
157. King, supra note 133.
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of a like character and with like aims.""' This standard is substantially
similar to the duty imposed upon fiduciaries under ERISA.' 9 These
principles are also consistent with the doctrine of "good faith and fair
dealing" in conducting consumer transactions and contracts. VSPs should
have a similar duty to viators. 160
a. What Should Happen to Valuable Medical Information
in the Hands of the VSP or Investor?
Because of their ties to the AIDS community and their knowledge of
other terminally ill conditions, VSPs are well informed about the
advancements in AIDS treatments and terminal illnesses. 161 Withholding
such information could be detrimental to the life of a terminally ill person.
To ensure that withholding such information does not become an issue, a
VSP should prohibit certain investors with valuable information regarding
a particular patient or illness from entering into the viatical settlement
agreement. 62 If at any time an investor would be in a position to
influence the treatment of the viator's illness, the investor should be
released from the viatical settlement contract or agreement.' This would
serve to better protect the dignity of a terminally ill person's condition.'
64
b. Potential Disclosure Obligations of the Owner to the
Seller
There are several options that may remedy the problem of inadequate
disclosure between the VSPs, VSBs, investors and viators. Such options
include: "(1) removing existing restraints on information; (2) correcting
misleading information; and (3) requiring additional information.'
16
1
Prior to entering into viatical settlements, many terminally ill persons
do not even know what a viatical settlement is, much less the risks
158. Viatical Ethics, The National Viatical Association, available at
http://www.nationalviatical.org/ethics.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2000). Buyers
and sellers can also check this website to see whether or not a broker is a member
of the association.
159. Employee Retirement Income Security Act 29 U.S.C. § 404(c) (1999).
160. See Viatical Ethics, supra note 158.
161. See MEALEY'S, supra note 78.
162. AP, State Asks Firms Buying Insurance to Sign Up Early, THE
TENNESSEAN, Aug. 27, 2000, at 5B.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Howard Beales, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24
J.L. & ECON. 491, 513 (1981). See also AP, supra note 162, at 5B.
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involved.' 66  The ramifications and reasonable alternatives should be
disclosed to each potential viator.16 Such disclosure should include both
legal and financial advice, outlining the risks associated with investing in
viatical settlements.' 68 In addition, the viator should also be aware that
the receipt of proceeds from a viatical settlement may affect a viator's
eligibility for certain state and federal "entitlement programs.,169
Receiving proceeds from a viatical settlement may also prevent a viator
from receiving disability or supplemental income benefits.' 70  Each of
these risks should be disclosed to the viator by a VSP or VSB prior to
entering into viatical settlements. Viators must be able to rely on more
than just the "ethics" of a VSB or VSP to ensure adequate disclosure. 7'
c. Prolonging the Life of the Viator Creates Serious
Investment Risks for the VSP or Investor
A major problem that needs to be addressed via regulation is the
inherent conflict of interest that VSPs face as the middlemen in the
viatical settlement process." VSPs do not necessarily have an incentive
to prolong the life of a viator. They owe primary loyalty to the investors
and not to the viators. 173 One possible remedy is to require VSPs to abide
by a "code of ethics.' 74 The National Viatical Association has adopted a
code entitled "Viatical Ethics."' All members of the National Viatical
Association must abide by these standards, pledging:
To prohibit certain business practices by viatical settlement
companies:
* unfair and deceptive acts;
* high pressure sales tactics;
* direct solicitation of viators;
* discrimination in the making of viatical settlement
offers; and





171. See Schmidt, supra note 57.
172. Id.
173. Perrault, supra note 33.
174. Rackham, supra note 40.
175. Viatical Ethics, National Viatical Association, available at
http://www.nationalviatical.org/ethics.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2000).
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collusion in bidding, including communication of any
offers made to a particular viator on a particular policy.
To perform our fiduciary responsibilities with respect to our clients so as• 176
not to create any adverse transactions.
Assuming proper enforcement, adopting such codes of ethics would
greatly reduce the incidences of fraud and abuse in the viatical settlement
process.
d. Creating a "Best Interests of the Seller" Standard
(1). Prohibiting VSPs and Investors From Harassing
Sellers
Investors have been known to call terminally ill patients to check on
the status of their illness or to see whether or not a patient has passed177
away. Investors may even attempt to visit hospitals, private homes, or
nursing homes in order to gather information on a viator's condition.178
Such instances of contact, or attempted contact, should be strictly
prohibited via uniform federal insurance regulation.
(2). The Status of Seller's Health Should Receive
Confidential Treatment
The somewhat relaxed nature of viatical settlement regulations often
lead to abuses. 79 As discussed supra, a patient's constitutional right to
privacy may be waived via contract or otherwise by viators and, thus,
medical records may become "open book." As VSBs seek to ensure
investors that the viators are indeed terminally ill, they may break
confidentiality barriers even absent an explicit waiver by a viator.' 8 It is
necessary for regulation to move in the direction of requiring compliance
with principles of confidentiality. VSPs and VSBs should hold the viator's
medical history or current medical condition in the strictest confidence."'
176. Id.
177. Schofield, supra note 30, at 47.
178. Shannon Milliner, The Kelco Group Advocates Revisions to NAIC Model
Viatical and Life Settlement Act, Increasing Consumer Protection, Bus. WIRE, Jan.
31, 2000, at 1.
179. See Eisenberg, supra note 43, at "Time Select Bus."
180. Schofield, supra note 30, at 47.
181. See National Viatical Association, supra note 175.
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B. What Other Alternatives Are Available for Terminally Ill Patients
Seeking Immediate Funds?
There certainly are alternative options for terminally ill persons to
derive other sources of income prior to death. t82 Such sources include
liens, or loans, against the life insurance policies of the terminally ill
person.'83 Under such a transaction, a policyholder may have the option
of borrowing against the stated value of the life insurance policy in
accordance with the terms provided by the issuing life insurance
company.'8 However, the full death benefits cannot be realized until the
181loan, including interest, has been repaid. In addition, such persons may
also obtain accelerated death benefits (ADBs). 18 ADBs allow terminally
ill persons to receive tax-free disbursements of their life insurance policies
prior to death. 87 ADBs are virtually identical to viatical settlements
absent the role of the viatical settlement company as the distributor.
These alternative sources, however, are not as readily available and are
not as economically beneficial as viatical settlements.9 Such alternatives
may only be available to persons with certain terminal illnesses who are
not expected to live longer than six months.'90 In addition, certain life
insurance policies may not have the accelerated benefit option
implemented into the policy and may not offer liens or loans against such
policies.' 9' If the policies do indeed provide for ADBs, they normally
require that a portion of the face value benefit be retained as a death
benefit for the named beneficiary.'2 Therefore, the immediate cash
amounts available using these alternatives are considerably less than
amounts available under viatical settlement agreements.9
Considering the impediments and disadvantages associated with these
182. See Crites-Leoni, supra note 16, at 2.
183. Id.
184. Laura Castaneda, How to Tap Life Insurance Policy Before You Die, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 10, 1997, at E3 (stating that holders of universal life insurance
policies may be able to borrow against such policies).
185. Id.
186. Eremia, supra note 2, at 774 n.8.
187. Id. See Ronald Ross, Accelerated Death Benefits' Tax Treatment Eased,
23 TAX'N FOR L., 229, 229 (1995).
188. Eremia, supra note 2, at 774.
189. Herron, supra note 95, at 970 n.192.
190. See Crites-Leoni, supra note 16, at 3.
191. Id.
192. Albert, supra note 44, at 1017 n.16.
193. Id.
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alternatives, it is not surprising that the viatical settlement industry
continues to grow and gain widespread popularity. 94  It appears,
therefore, that viatical settlements will be available for quite some time.9
CONCLUSION
Is it ethical to gamble on people's lives?"' Tom Volz, a prostate cancer
patient with approximately two to three years left to live, is thankful that
someone has decided to gamble on his life.'9 He received a viatical
settlement of $58,500 for a life insurance policy with a face value of
$150,000. While this sum only represents forty percent of the policy's
total worth, he now has the resources to enjoy a trip to Hawaii and herbal
remedies that are not covered by medical insurance. 98
From an investor or VSP perspective, the ultimate profit is realized the
sooner the viator dies.'9 For the viatical industry, death is certainly "good
for business. ' '200 Despite the possible unethical and immoral nature of
viatical settlements, they have proven to be a profitable tool for viators,
investors and VSPs alike. The rising sales from viatical settlement
contracts are currently approaching the $1.4 billion mark. 20
Accordingly, it is necessary for regulation to keep up with the growth of
the viatical settlement industry. The ultimate goal of such regulation must
be to maximize the protection of viators' best interests and dignity in
dealing with the sensitive nature of terminal illnesses and death. In
addition, the vast instances of fraud and pressure selling must be
addressed through federal regulation. These goals can be achieved if
certain principles of fiduciary law are imposed on VSPs and VSBs. In
addition, such principles should be adopted in a uniform regulatory body,
thus eliminating the current problem of insufficient regulation among the
states. As Bill McDonald, Chief of Enforcement for the California
Department of Corporations indicated, "[Pirofitability is related to the
194. See Nagy, supra note 6, at 245.
195. Cruz, supra note 33, at 6D. Viatical settlements are even popping up in
the UK. However, their success overseas depends on the resolution of certain
regulatory, tax and ethical issues. In addition, the role of the National Health
Service in providing free healthcare in the UK may reduce the potential viatical
settlement market. See Viatical Statistics, MONEY MARKET, Mar. 16, 2000, at 55.
196. Kosiewicz, supra note 18, at 701.
197. Eisenberg, supra note 43, at "Time Bus. Select."
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201. Id.
The Viatical Settlement Industry
predictability of death, which has proved to be singularly
unpredictable.
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